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Woody Allen: An Essay on the Nature of the Comical. Vittorio Hösle; Notre Dame, 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007; x + 96 pages. (“Preface to the English 
Book Version,” “Notes,” “Index of Films by Woody Allen,” no other index, no 
bibliography.) $18.00 paperback;  978-0-268-03104-6. 
 
 
 
§1. I don’t really know what Professor Hösle’s little book is about, what its main theses 
are, or what its author intended to accomplish. Never mind. I can barely make my way 
through an Archie comic, let alone figure out “Non Sequitur.” 
 
That’s not quite true. Vittorio Hösle (hereafter, “VH”) tells us right away that, “the 
whole point” (not part of the point) “of my book is that Allen is a profoundly 
philosophical comedian” (p. x). In reply to this bold assertion, I wrote in the margin, 
using an extra fine green Pilot Precise V5 rolling ball pen (made in Japan), “Geeze, 
anyone who paid attention already knew this. Or is the emphasis here on profoundly?” 
The originality of VH’s book, then, lies in the thesis that Allen is not merely a run-of-
the-mill philosophical comedian (as are, for example, Steve Martin, Rodney 
Dangerfield, and Gilbert Gottfried), but that he is a profoundly philosophical comedian 
(as are, says VH, Aristophanes and Molière). I have trouble measuring “profundity.” 
Further, about here I get lost, being largely, it seems, undereducated and hence
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culturally illiterate, and not even a switch to a blue Pilot helps. In his “Index of Films 
by Woody Allen” (pp. 95-96), VH lists 41 movies (a connotatively neutral term, 
between the crude “flick” and the intellectually respectable “film,” which is why the 
contemporary mega-university doesn’t have a “Flick Studies” program). VH must have 
seen them all, because according to the Index all are discussed or mentioned 
somewhere in the book. I’m clearly Allen-challenged, for (mea culpa) I’ve seen only a 
dozen: Annie Hall*, Bananas, Crimes and Misdemeanors*, Everything You Always 
Wanted to Know about Sex, Hannah and Her Sisters*, Play It Again, Sam, Purple Rose 
of Cairo, Sleeper, Take the Money and Run, What’s New, Pussycat?, Zelig, and Antz* 
(asterisked films = my daughter Rachel and I own the DVD). True, I’ve seen some of 
them more than once, and I keep getting more out of each viewing. (The same applies 
to Monsters, Inc.) Nevertheless, the only scholar capable of reviewing this book is one 
who has seen all the Allen films listed by VH. Anything short of that (plus 
Aristophanes, Molière, Shakespeare, Arthur Miller, et al.) would be an injustice. 
Unperturbed, I plow forward, relying on the excuse that I would have viewed and 
perhaps purchased all 41 (or so) films if and only if I had been planning to write a book 
on Allen. 
 
I soon realized that something else was not quite right about VH’s claim that Allen is a 
“profoundly philosophical comedian.” VH continues, in the Preface, with “my focus is 
on the philosophical dimensions of [Allen’s] jokes and comical situations” (p. x), which 
permits us to assume that by “comedian” VH means one who creates jokes and comical 
situations – as well as comedies (a film genre) that contain jokes and comic situations. 
But a few lines later, VH says that his “essay aims at being . . . an analysis of the 
unique features of Allen’s comical universe,” which apparently (if it means anything) 
expands VH’s territory beyond Allen the comedian and his jokes and comical situations 
and comedies. VH plans to take his readers on a magic carpet ride through a comic-
cosmic universe, when most of them still haven’t seen the Liberty Bell or sat through a 
live performance of Saturday Night Live. All this talk of Allen being a “profoundly 
philosophical comedian,” however, is misleading. Two examples exhibit the 
equivocation. A few pages into the book (p. 7), VH lists three questions he addresses 
about Allen in the book. One is: “What makes some of his films philosophically so 
profound?” Maybe VH was economizing (in such a short book, saving one word?), but 
the question doesn’t assert that Allen’s comedies are philosophically profound. Instead, 
“some” of Allen’s films (which ones?) are philosophically profound. VH is not sticking 
to his “whole point.” The second example comes from the title of the penultimate 
section of the book, “The Great Philosophical Issues in Allen’s Movies” (p. 57). Our 
options are, first, to grant VH the freedom to omit a word (“comical,” before “movies”) 
to save space or, second, to insist on the equivocation. The first makes out VH and 
UND Press to be extraordinarily silly, in sacrificing accuracy to save an unnoticeable 
amount of space; the second strikes a hard blow at the coherence of VH’s book, his 
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“whole point” of the Preface to the book being denied by the book itself. Indeed, a 
close examination of this section of the book (pp. 57-84) doesn’t make the point that 
Allen the comic/comedian is profoundly philosophical, but that Allen simpliciter is. 
(Analytic philosophers of film and analytic film studies scholars will rebel at much of 
VH’s book, while the stereotypical continental metaphysician, the philosopher Allen 
himself satirizes and caricatures in his books and films, will feel right at home.) For 
example: 
 
Mickey in Hannah and Her Sisters is saved from his suicidal intentions, 
connected with his incapacity to find out whether God really exists, by the Marx 
Brothers’ Duck Soup, which does not solve his theological problem but shows 
that it is not necessary to do so in order to enjoy life. [p. 79] 
 
Overlook for now that VH has inaccurately interpreted what Mickey has figured out, 
“that it is not necessary to do so [to know whether God exists] in order to enjoy life” (p. 
79). I’ll discuss this issue in §8. The point to be made here is that it is not Allen qua 
comic or comedian that has led us (along with the Woody persona Mickey) to this 
theological-philosophical position. The expression of this position is embedded in a 
film that is generally comedic, but nothing about Mickey’s doubts about the value of 
life in a godless universe was portrayed comically. The fact that Mickey might have 
answered the question for himself by accidentally running into Duck Soup at the right 
time doesn’t mean that Allen is a philosophical comedian. It means that he has the 
talent to broach philosophical matters in his films, but neither qua comic nor qua 
comedian, or at least not always and only. 
 
There is another equivocation, one that I have displayed but have not yet explicitly 
brought attention to, between VH’s claim that Woody Allen is a “profoundly 
philosophical” comedian and his claim that Allen is a “philosophically profound” 
comedian. These descriptions are not equivalent. Because VH in his Preface uses the 
phrase “profoundly philosophical” when stating the “whole point” of his book, we 
should probably favor that attribution. “Philosophically profound” is strongly 
complimentary, putting Allen on the level of the great dead white male philosophers. 
“Profoundly philosophical” is more accurate, modest, and plausible. In this case, we are 
saying that Allen’s films are thickly philosophical – they contain philosophical 
allusions and raise philosophical questions – but are not committing ourselves to the 
thesis that his films handle philosophical matters in a profound way. Indeed, Allen’s 
films do not probe philosophical problems profoundly. As a student and purveyor of 
philosophy, Allen is at best a sophomore, at worst a Sophist. In Purple Rose of Cairo, 
Cecilia’s man Tom is perfect except that he’s fictional. That’s a cute allusion, and only 
a cute allusion, to St. Anselm’s and Descartes’s ontological argument for God’s 
existence (see VH, p. 73), for Allen goes no deeper than the allusion. Allen’s 
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philosophical superficiality is not altogether his fault. Film as a medium cannot be 
geared toward being philosophically profound. It can be only profoundly philosophical, 
as in VH’s thesis. But that success is not very exciting. It’s mundane. We are provoked 
more philosophically by, say, Allen’s Getting Even, a work in the medium of printed 
prose, than we are by his work in the medium of film. 
 
§2. If it is possible for a tiny book of exactly 87 small (6½" x 3.75") text pages to be 
about too many things (theories of humor and Woody Allen’s films), this is that tiny 
book. If it is possible to write a 64% rambling and a 47% boring book about Woody 
Allen’s films, this is that book. If it is possible to write about humor without cracking 
one single original joke or letting loose with some well-deserved ridiculing sarcasm 
(repeating Allen’s jokes doesn’t count), that challenging task has now been 
accomplished. The problem with God, infinity, consciousness, and this little book, is 
that they are all inherently inexplicable, like my psoriatic arthropathy. To make life 
worse, none of them are funny. 
 
Another book on Woody Allen, a superb collection of fifteen essays gathered together 
in Woody Allen and Philosophy: You Mean My Whole Fallacy is Wrong?, was 
published in 2004, three years before VH’s book.1 In contrast to VH’s humorlessness, 
the writer of the “Foreword” (Tom Morris), the editors (Mark Conard and someone 
called, improbably, and a joke unto itself, “Aeon Skoble”), and many of the 
contributing authors have a sense of humor and are not afraid to show it. In their 
“Introduction,” the editors point out that some philosophers see Allen as an optimist 
while others see him as a pessimist, and conclude with the punch line, “philosophers 
disagreeing about interpretation of art – go figure” (p. 2). This is not an Allen-style 
quip, but cute nonetheless. All the biographical sketches of the contributors in the 
book’s back matter (“All These Great Minds” [pp. 261-264]) end with a snappy line. 
For example, Jerold Abrams “buys art by the yard”; Per Broman wants “to be 
nominated to the Academy of the Overrated”; Sander Lee “will always choose God 
over the truth”; Mary Nichols “is astounded by people who want to know the universe 
when she finds it hard enough to find her way around Chinatown”; and James South 
“does not respond well to mellow.” The inclusion of this humor, however, is 
misleading and, to my mind, is only two meters away from plagiarism. Readers not “in 
the know” about Allen’s corpus will wrongly take these jokes to be original, each 
created by the two editors or the contributing authors.2 Conard and Skoble might have 
assumed that only readers “in the know” would bother with the volume and believed 
that it would insult their intelligence to provide proper citations. Only Tom Morris’s 
foreword successfully incorporates new Allen-style humor into the text: “This comedic 
genius isn’t just a comic. He has made some thoroughly serious films as well, with no 
jokes whatsoever. These also tend to be the ones with no audiences whatsoever. But 
they are all very well done, and extremely powerful in their explorations of the human 
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condition” (p. ix). Nice, although on a good day (any one with no hurricane or bursting 
water pipes) I almost prefer my version: “This comedic genius isn’t just a comic. He 
has made some thoroughly serious films as well, with no jokes whatsoever. These films 
are very well done, are powerful explorations of the human condition, and make it 
easier to find a good seat.”3 
 
Maybe, because I am a descendent of Romanian and Ukrainian Jewish shtetl dwellers, 
an American, and a former inhabitant of the Mid-West – that is, not a cosmopolitan, 
sophisticated European – I have overlooked the author’s subtle humor. The following 
passage might actually include a small gem (p. 39): “[M]isunderstandings are a popular 
source of comic effects” which “may be caused by homonyms and homophones (such 
as Oedipus Wrecks/Oedipus Rex). . . . Allen already dealt with this particular form of 
misunderstanding in one of his early texts (which, by the way, contain in germ many 
ideas of the later films).” Allen often plays a character who is obsessed with Nazis, 
Hitler, Germany, and the anti-Semitic epithet “Jew” in a quickly-spoken “did you” 
(Annie Hall). For my part, I have always sensed something sinister about the “Jew” in 
“juice,” regardless of its fruit of origin. (“Jumex,” a south-of-the-border brand, barely 
conceals its anti-Semitism.) This sensitivity, which I share with Allen, bewilders me 
when I come across VH’s juxtaposition “germ many” in the parenthetical clause above. 
Is this phrase a deliberate, playful amphibolous homonym, which displays precisely the 
Allen technique that VH is here discussing? “The texts contain in Germany [but not in 
Ethiopia] ideas of the later films.” To make the same point, VH could have written, 
instead, “contain the germs of many ideas,” which would have been funny in a different 
way, indeed, funnier than this one mild joke I am charitably granting to him. I struggled 
mightily to use VH’s phrase in another amphibolous homonym. The best I could come 
up with is this pair of sentences: “We should avoid this germ. Manic people have 
difficulty doing so” and “We should avoid this. Germanic people have difficulty doing 
so.” Note, before we leave this soon-to-be-run-on paragraph, that VH underestimates 
the knowledge of and insults his readers by inserting the obvious “Oedipus Rex” as 
Allen’s intended homophone of “Oedipus Wrecks.” By itself, “such as Oedipus 
Wrecks” would have done well enough in that sentence. I would be pedantically 
underestimating my readers were I to explain laboriously how “I am a descendent of 
Romanian and Ukrainian Jewish shtetl dwellers, an American, and a former inhabitant 
of the Mid-West” is nearly LOL amphibolous, saved by a mere comma. 
 
§3. One reviewer of VH’s book chides him for ignoring Allen’s Jewishness: 
 
We both laugh with Woody as he makes clever observations, and laugh at him 
for being a neurotic schlemiel (habitual bungler) and a schlimazel (born loser). I 
am inserting these terms here. Curiously, Hösle doesn't make use of the rich 
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Yiddish comic vocabulary and doesn't connect Allen's comedy with traditional 
Jewish humor.4 
 
It’s not that VH never mentions Jews, Hebrews, or this feature of Allen’s humor. He 
does, on a number of pages: 10, 17, 22, 42, 44, 50, 66, 68, 87. But there is no real 
engagement with these themes. For example, VH does not address a Jewish-style joke 
in Annie Hall (which joke VH knows well): Two elderly women are at a Catskill resort. 
One says, “The food at this place is really terrible.” The other one replies, “I know; and 
such small portions.” Were VH to engage “Jews in the ars comica,” he would 
inevitably have to move beyond Allen to consider Lenny Bruce, Gilda Radner, Adam 
Sandler, Billy Crystal, Nora Ephron, Sarah Silverman, and novelist Philip Roth. Doing 
this would have taken VH beyond the scope of this tiny book, but it might have 
rounded out his understanding of Allen. In his notes, VH – the innocent tease? – 
mentions two other topics that he does not discuss. Why not? He tells us (p. 90, note 
11) that there are “many connections between food and sex in Allen’s movies,” but he 
fails to provide even one example. (“Not only did the prostitute just lie there; it was 
over in 90 seconds.”) This is rich territory for mining Allen the Jew. VH also refers to 
“the feminist critique of Woody Allen” (p. 93, note 52) without letting us know what 
that critique is. Further, VH’s definite description here is wrong; there are many kinds 
of feminism and not all feminists dislike or criticize Allen. Nor do all Jews or all 
feminists object to Philip Roth. At any rate, when VH does attempt to engage Allen the 
Jew, we get conflicting messages: 
 
[T]he Woody persona [in Allen’s films] fears success and happiness . . . because 
that would make him like the others, and even if he longs for happiness and 
integration, he knows that it would destroy his peculiar identity (which in its 
refusal to blend in with the environment is profoundly Jewish and, 
paradoxically in the case of Allen, culminates in the rejection of a traditional 
Jewish identity). [p. 44] 
 
[M]uch of the vis comica of the Woody persona stems from the problems 
encountered by a man rooted more profoundly than he would like to admit in 
traditional Jewish values. [p. 87] 
 
To avoid the possible contradiction between the “rejection” of a Jewish identity and 
“rooted . . . profoundly” in Jewish values, we could rely on the difference between 
“identity” and “values” or we could rely on the difference between the Woody persona 
and Woody Allen. “Paradoxically” is meant to alert us to an important way the Woody 
persona deviates from the “real” Woody Allen. I do not think either move is 
satisfactory. The first is trivial; the second is ad hoc and (as VH does throughout the 
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book) exaggerates the difference between Allen’s film personae and the “real” Allen. 
Conflicting messages occur frequently in the book. Here’s another example: 
 
Allen’s type of comedy is markedly different from the New Comedy that 
developed in Hellenism. . . . It is much closer to [the Old Comedy of] 
Aristophanes. . . . Allen is closer to the New than to the Old Comedy. . . . [p. 84, 
p. 86; see also p. 7] 
 
With time, diligence, coffee, cigarettes, and jelly beans, I could probably figure it out. 
If not, I could always go to a flick for a couple of hours of brainless refreshment from 
my profoundly philosophical or exegetical thinking. 
 
Two points are worth mentioning here, even if they have been mentioned before, by 
greater and quicker minds than mine. Allen might be a wonderful writer and director of 
movies; he might be a comic of the rank of Aristophanes; he might have superbly 
probed philosophy and the human condition. Still, when push comes to shove, I reject 
admiring Allen for the purported depth of his vision. Allen makes us laugh, which is a 
laudable skill. But after viewing The Devil’s Arithmetic, Sophie’s Choice, Schindler’s 
List, and (perhaps) The Sorrow and the Pity, I look back on Allen’s films as a bunch of 
tiny, insignificant, superficial jokes. So I wonder why in the world any authors would 
bother to write books (and more books) about Allen. VH says about the Holocaust only 
that “the Jewish form of intellectuality, so monstrously decimated in Europe, survived 
in the United States” (p. 87). Why did not VH continue with “and that U.S. Jewish 
intellectuality, especially in the hands of Allen” (as opposed, say, to Philip Roth), “is 
small consolation and an ineffective palliative”? Were Allen to make a movie on the 
Holocaust, would it be the totally serious sort of investigation of the human-cum-Jewish 
condition that would allow us all to find good seats? Maybe it would be, instead, full of 
slapstick, parody, and amusing ironies – a Play It Again, Adolf, which would 
complement Charlie Chaplin’s The Great Dictator – thereby turning the Holocaust into 
a Manhattan cocktail party or a mishpucka Pesach dinner.5 (“Frankenhole,” a series in 
the Cartoon Network’s Adult Swim “program block,” in 2010 included an episode 
“Heal Hitler,” in which Das Führer wants his brain surgically fixed to eliminate the 
portion that causes him to hate Jews. This Frankenhole episode was aired, even though 
a Frankenhole episode on Mother Teresa was censored.)6 
 
Second, there is something eerily the same about Diane Keaton and Mia Farrow. I’ve 
seen Keaton in Annie Hall a dozen times, and I’ve seen Farrow in a few of Allen’s 
films. I am struck by the similarity in the mannerisms, including bodily motions and 
linguistic style, of Keaton and Farrow. Is this similarity due to the precision of Allen’s 
directing, molding both women to mimic accurately the other’s cinematic persona? Or 
does the similarity reflect a genuine personality affinity, so that we see the real women 
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in the movies and not merely their staged personae? Of course we see both. But does 
the distinction between the real women and their personae fall apart in this particular 
aspect? Allen knows better than I do whether we have here a case of Freud’s repetition 
compulsion in his personal life, moving from one lover to another, similar lover. I know 
better than Allen does that my second wife was as bad as my first wife, and for the 
same reasons. 
 
VH tells us that he calls “the comic hero played by Woody Allen the Woody persona – 
to distinguish him from the real human being” (p. 4), batting not one self-referential 
eyelash over his literal use of “real.” Yet in a note to this sentence (p. 89, note 2), VH 
reports that Diane Jacobs had already distinguished “the Woody persona, Allen 
(Woody Allen the creator), and Mr. Allen, the famous and wealthy man.” VH does not 
reject her view. Does this mean that there are two “real” Woody Allens, the creator and 
the wealthy man? Or does it mean that there are two Woody personae, the ordinary 
film-bound Woody persona (for example, Alvy in Annie Hall) and Allen the creator? 
Or is Allen the wealthy man the second persona? There is some truth in the 
(postmodernist) claim that we are always impersonating someone even to ourselves, 
when, for example, taking a relaxing bath in a quiet house. We are well on our way to 
the view that there is no real Woody Allen but only a bunch of Woody Allen personae 
held together by . . . what? He would not like the answer: his immortal Cartesian ego. 
 
Consider the scene in Annie Hall in which Marshall McLuhan steps into the movie 
theatre lobby and chides the obnoxiously loquacious academic. Allen (as Alvy) 
addresses the audience aside, speaking (in pretense) from out of the screen to we film 
viewers in our seats: “Boy, if life were only like this.” VH remarks: “The scene is 
fascinating [in part] because it breaks through the illusion the artwork creates” (p. 41). I 
take VH to mean (in part) that the illusion (deception) involved in Woody Allen’s 
pretending to be Alvy, that is, Allen’s taking on the Alvy persona and submerging his 
own real person, is briefly suspended. This is suggested by VH’s “breaks through the 
illusion.” No. The most we are entitled to say (because the so-called “breaking through” 
occurs in the film) is that we dealing with two personae, the Woody-Alvy persona in 
the film and the Woody persona who speaks aside to the audience. It makes no sense to 
say, as VH says, that the film’s illusion has been suspended. (The Allen who created 
Purple Rose of Cairo agrees with me; the illusion is broken only if the persona exits the 
film altogether, ending up in the real theater.) Instead, one illusion has been replaced by 
another illusion. We could even say that we have here only one seamless, more 
complex illusion. After all, Allen (the persona Alvy) was speaking to viewers in their 
seats even before McLuhan popped up, that is, throughout all the events that had 
already transpired in the film before this scene. All that earlier deception or illusion was 
Allen’s pretending not to be speaking (impossibly) to the audience in their seats. 
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§4. The obvious absence of philosophy in most flicks, which medium astounds us 
nowadays by incredible special effects that portray explosions and violence in realistic, 
intricate detail, almost always guarantees the brainless refreshment I was seeking a few 
paragraphs above. Even these superficial films, if we actively allow them, stimulate 
thoughts about philosophical problems, but only that. They need not be profound to 
stimulate us; that, too, is one of our roles as viewers, to take or make a cue while 
watching a matinée. Hence, I offer a more extreme thesis, one that confronts VH in his 
own ball park. Films, comedy or drama, are rarely if ever “philosophically profound” in 
themselves. I would not be impressed were professors of film studies to drop names 
here such as Akira Kurosawa, Lina Wertmüller, Ingmar Bergman, Federico Fellini, and 
François Truffaut. The latter’s Fahrenheit 451 is terrible, a crime against Ray 
Bradbury’s book, nearly killing off internal material from which we might have 
extracted some philosophical cues, while Quentin Tarantino’s 1994 Pulp Fiction and 
Troy Duffy’s 1999 Boondock Saints offer more meat on the bone, that is, allow 
viewers, those who get excited when hints of philosophical themes make an appearance 
in a movie, to create and then develop the appropriate cues from the film’s raw scenes 
and raw dialogue, its “brute facts.” 
 
Television programs are quick bytes, lasting around 25 or 50 minutes, which is not 
much time for spewing profoundly philosophical cues. Rod Serling’s Twilight Zone 
was the antidote to Leave It to Beaver, but a determined couch potato could turn a 
father-son scene from Beaver into a searching examination of the body politic or a 
domestic quarrel between Ray Romano and his wife Deborah in Everybody Loves 
Raymond into an occasion for discussing recent twists in the sex-gender wars. Episodes 
of Law and Order frequently state opposing philosophical positions without digging 
deeply into their differences. Most of these difficult, audience-grabbing (because 
sensational or notorious) legal and moral questions have to do with unsolvable 
dilemmas that arise in the conflict between utilitarianism and its nemesis, deontology, 
even if the technical vocabulary is not inserted into the script. The question of priority 
between the Right and the Good is left unanswered, or the answer changes from one 
episode to the next. The inquiry never gets any more illuminating than a Larry King 
interview, although the sarcastic lines put into the mouth of Jerry Orbach as Detective 
Lennie Briscoe, after he finds a dead body, are priceless. (I was surprised to discover 
the Law and Order personnel who played roles in Allen’s films. Go ahead, Google.) 
 
We might analogize movies to novels and TV programs to novellas and short stories, 
thereby suggesting that it is the length of the screenplay that allows a film to be 
philosophical in ways that TV programs cannot be. No. Film does not do that much 
better with 90 to 150 minutes of foreboding glances, enigmatic dialogue, arcane 
allusions, and multicontinental landscapes. By contrast, consider the profound 
philosophical thinking you have to do over the weeks, months, or years required to get 
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through and comprehend, say, a serious work by Kripke or Heidegger or Rawls or 
Marx. I can lecture continuously for 90 minutes and barely scratch the surface of a 
philosophical topic, and it’s not my fault. Why anyone other than film studies’ 
personnel, movie makers, and the editorial board of Film & Philosophy would claim 
that films are profoundly philosophical is, for me, a mystery. Movies can provoke 
philosophical thought or thought about philosophical issues, but they cannot do 
philosophy. A film version of Plato’s Symposium would be a film that is thoroughly 
philosophical but, as Morris suggests, it would have no audience at all. (I’d like to try 
writing the screenplay for Thomas Hobbes’s State of Nature or Rawls’s Original 
Position.) Further, having the ability to provoke thought about humankind’s central 
questions about itself is hardly unique to film, and there’s no reason to think that film as 
a medium has more power to provoke this kind of thought than musical lyrics, the 
written word, puppet shows, and the plastic arts. Journals such as Film & Philosophy 
and Philosophy and Literature are honest only if they promote the philosophical study 
of film and literature; they are bogus to the extent that they purport to find solid and 
intricate philosophy elsewhere than in the books written by the stars of our field. 
Passages from Brothers Karamazov raise philosophical questions, to be sure, as do 
passages from Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover and collections of Calvin and 
Hobbes comic strips, or almost any other book you randomly pick up. The limit to and 
source of philosophical provocation is your own curiosity and intelligence. Almost the 
whole of Crime and Punishment can be seen as a philosophical treatise; but that it can 
be seen as such a thing does not make it such a thing. Dostoyevsky was not a 
philosopher (nor was Camus); his examination of philosophical issues is less deep than 
Philosophy for Dummies and certainly less well organized. What we learn from Sartre’s 
plays is that drama and novels can at best provide, by their natures, examples of 
philosophical views, themes, and people. Alas, this is the fate also of Woody Allen. As 
VH reminds us, many of the “germs” of the ideas expressed in his films appeared in his 
slim volumes Getting Even, Without Feathers, and Side Effects. Allen’s films do not go 
any deeper into the philosophical issues raised or alluded to in these comical writings. 
All the films do is to give voices and bodies to the ideas and to tell stories about the 
people who think along the lines of (or deny) his satiric view of life and philosophy. 
VH discusses at length Allen’s Annie Hall, Hannah and Her Sisters, and Crimes and 
Misdemeanors. That choice says a lot about the philosophical profundity of Allen’s 
films. The philosophical messages or slogans that emerge from threes three films 
(arguably the most important films in understanding Allen’s vision) are not profound; 
and to the extent that these films are profound, that has nothing to do with their being 
comedies. The “whole point” or punch line of these films can be summed up briefly. 
I’ll do that later in §8 (I alluded to it in §1). In the meantime, don’t get me started on 
Kindle and how it makes my multicolored Pilots obsolete. 
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§5. We learn from Morris’s foreword (p. x) to Woody Allen and Philosophy and his 
biographical sketch (p. 263) that he taught philosophy at Notre Dame for fifteen years 
and showed clips from Allen’s films in his “most popular classes” at that university. 
Some American Catholics do appreciate Allen, and even if Woody is an atheist, he’s 
too lovable for believing Catholics to take him seriously. Nor does Allen get in your 
face in the brash manner of Madalyn Murray O'Hair. The fact that Morris, an Allen 
scholar, and VH, another Allen scholar, both taught at Notre Dame provoked me to 
investigate links between them. What I quickly found out is that they were not at Notre 
Dame at the same time, Morris leaving in 19967 and VH arriving later, in 1999. Who 
taught philosophy using clips from Allen’s movies after Morris left? Did VH pick up 
the slack? Included in the list of 27 courses VH has taught at Notre Dame (see pp. 31-
32 of the printed English version of his curriculum vitae)8 is “Theory of Comedy.” I 
couldn’t uncover the syllabus or the date(s) the course was offered – a dead end. But 
other investigations turned up interesting connections, or lack of them, between VH and 
other scholars who have studied and written about Woody Allen and his films. 
 
I counted, in the “Notes” (the book contains no bibliography), ten books about Woody 
Allen to which VH refers, four from the 1980s and six from the 1990s. (That at least ten 
books about Woody Allen existed before the 21st Century is, for me, amazing.) VH’s 
showing in his book an acquaintance with the literature in this cottage industry perhaps 
explains why Ian Jarvie judges that VH “has an impressive command of Allen’s work, 
including the short stories and secondary literature.”9 The first version of VH’s book on 
Allen was published in the journal Film & Philosophy (vol. 5, Dec. 2000), an issue 
devoted to Woody Allen and edited by Sander Lee. Since that time, in 2004, the 
Conard-Skoble collection was published. Three years later, VH brought out this 
expanded revision of his Film & Philosophy essay (originally entitled “Why Do We 
Laugh at and with Woody Allen?”). What is hard to understand, if VH has mastered the 
secondary literature and is a scrupulous scholar, is that VH (with minor exceptions) 
ignored the other essays from the Film & Philosophy Woody Allen issue and the essays 
in the Conard-Skoble volume. This pattern is odd in itself, but especially because one 
of the most frequently referred to films in VH’s book is Crimes and Misdemeanors (see 
the film index, pp. 95-96), out of the eleven essays in Film & Philosophy, five (!) are on 
Crimes and Misdemeanors, and in the Conard-Skoble collection, the most frequently 
referred to films are Crimes and Misdemeanors and Annie Hall (see Index, p. 265).10 
None of the mentions of Arthur Schopenhauer and Henri Bergson that occurs in 
Conard-Skoble, the two philosophical stars of VH’s book, is noted by VH. By ignoring 
both Film & Philosophy and Conard-Skoble, VH writes in a near vacuum of his own 
creation, isolating himself in a protective sterile bubble. In the Conard-Skoble volume, 
43 rather than 41 Allen films are listed in the “Filmography” (pp. 259-260). One film 
not included in VH’s Index is the 1998 cartoon Antz; the other is the 2004 Melinda and 
Melinda. I do not mind that VH did not revise the original essay to squeeze in some 
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commentary on the 2004 movie, but I do mind that the revision does not acknowledge 
the 2004 Conard-Skoble collection. Maybe VH’s failure to recognize other scholars in 
his community partially explains why no one I know knows of VH (of course I know 
myself), despite the thirty-nine pages of his stupendous curriculum vitae. What goes 
around comes around. Not one contributing author in the 2004 Conard-Skoble volume 
refers to VH’s essay as it first appeared in the 2000 Film & Philosophy issue. A 
gushing account of VH’s accomplishments in Notre Dame Magazine says both that VH 
is “a world-renowned philosopher” and “in U.S. academic circles he is not yet widely 
known,”11 failing to eliminate the contradiction. There is another reason I’ve never 
heard of VH. He has written around thirty scholarly books, but only eight have been or 
will be published in the U.S. (in English), and all eight are on “the list” of his home 
institution, the University of Notre Dame Press. (I know this jargon from hearing from 
publishers that they have no room, unfortunately, on their list for my book. C’mon, it’s 
not rocket science. Click on “Page Layout” and “Margins,” and we’re all set.) 
 
§6. The brevity of this book is counterbalanced not by concise profundity (or concise 
Allenian witticisms) but by illogically long, run-on paragraphs – which is partly why I 
judged the book to be “rambling.” One paragraph, for example, goes from the middle of 
page 38 to the top few lines of page 41; another paragraph stretches from the middle of 
page 77 to the end of page 79; and another starts at the bottom third of page 9 and ends 
with a few lines at the top of page 12. The green Pilot pen remarked, “Why such long 
paragraphs?” It also calculated 1.3 pages/paragraph. Germans write long sentences, to 
be sure, and VH is no exception, but long sentences need not be transmogrified into 
long paragraphs, if the German in question is writing an essay in English. However, we 
should not ask why this book is made up of so few paragraphs, but why so damn many? 
Why are we readers forced to disrupt our trains of thought, in a kind of coitus 
interruptus, by the author’s thoughtlessly inserting paragraph breaks? Having included 
several paragraphs, with either the grudging or supportive permission of a UND Press 
copyeditor, that are 2½ pages long, it would not have been a radical extension to have 
turned this short book into one fat and flowing stream-of-consciousness paragraph. 
 
In his review of VH’s book, John Morreall (see note 4) accuses VH of being pedantic. 
“The tendency toward pedantry shows up . . . in some of Hösle's writing, as in the 
redundant “indispensable prerequisite” (p. 4), “too overopinionated” (p. 66), and 
“appearance of a deus ex machina from above” (p. 54). These phrases do not strike me 
as cases of pedantry. I believe that the main sense of “pedant” is “a person who makes 
an excessive or inappropriate display of learning.”12 VH uses “pedantry” properly: 
“Allen here is making fun of professors’ pedantry” (p. 39), as Allen does with respect 
to the loud-mouthed professor in Annie Hall who lets everyone in the movie theater 
lobby know that he teaches a course on Marshall McLuhan (p. 41). If Morreall 
inaccurately uses “pedantic” to describe those three phrases in VH’s book, then what 
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would an accurate description be? I think the repetitive awkwardness of the phrases is a 
symptom of the fact that English is not VH’s native language. The awkwardly-written 
sentences, the conflicting messages, the rambling and run-on paragraphs, the inelegant 
phrases, and the frequency with which VH uses the word “profound,” thereby diluting 
its power and making it empty13 – these are evidence that VH has not mastered 
(American) English. It is ironic, then, that we find out from his curriculum vitae (p. 39), 
and which is repeated in the article about him in Notre Dame Magazine, that VH 
(trying vainly to outdo Yale’s late John Boswell) has “Active knowledge of German, 
Italian, English, Spanish, Russian, Norwegian, and French; passive knowledge of Latin, 
Greek, Sanskrit, Pali, Avestan, Portuguese, Catalan, Modern Greek, Swedish, and 
Danish.” The linguistic infelicities in VH’s book are all the more perplexing because 
his “friend Mark Roche” suggested “linguistic and substantive improvements” to the 
2000 Film & Philosophy version of the book (p. ix) and the 2000 Film & Philosophy 
essay was copyedited while it slouched toward its reincarnated 2007 publication (p. x). 
VH needs to be advised that some of the wording in the English version of his 
curriculum vitae is wrong. On the first page, VH provides as his “Current Address” his 
department and office address and, as his “Permanent Address,” he gives his home 
address. Why not simply the accurate “Office” and “Home” addresses and contact 
information? “Current Address” is wrongly applied to his office, for VH is by now 
well-entrenched at Notre Dame and his office address has more claim to permanency 
than his home address, which may well change if the Hösle family comes across a more 
comfortable house in which to live. I’m not being pedantic. I’m quibbling. 
 
Still, who is the real VH, the one at the Current Address (the professor in his office and 
on the classroom stage, lecturing with pizzazz) or the one at his Permanent Address (the 
quiet husband and father)? Which one is the pretended persona: the face VH shows to 
his loved ones or the face he shows to his colleagues and students? Which face does his 
friend Mark Roche see, the person or the persona (or both)? How can we tell the 
difference? If the real VH is the one who lives at his Permanent Address, his family and 
his real life are given short shrift in his 39-page curriculum vitae, occupying three lines 
at the very end under “Personal.” But maybe the VH persona is the one who interacts 
with VH’s real family. Now we have to admit into our ontology a fourth Woody Allen, 
the one left over when we subtract Allen the Woody personae, Allen the creator, and 
Allen the wealthy man: the “personal” Allen. Which one or combination did Soon Yi 
Previn marry in 1997? Did she know that she was marrying that one? Philosophers will 
warn us that we cannot substitute salve veritate one face for another in intentional 
contexts. 
 
§7. Masturbation is sex with someone I love, and I don’t have to worry about finding a 
cab home at 3 in the morning. Masturbation is sex with someone I love, so I don’t have 
to primp. How do you expect me to answer “To be or not to be?” when I haven’t made 
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any progress on “To cheat or not to cheat?” How do you expect me to fathom “To cheat 
or not to cheat?” when I haven’t yet solved “To kiss or not to kiss?” There’s nothing 
that gives us a scent of the spiritual or an intimation of the presence of the divine as 
well as those magnificent medieval paintings of the suffering of Christ and Monday 
Night Football. “Sex is one of the most beautiful, natural, wholesome things that money 
can buy.”14 The male author of a magazine article about women says that they are “the 
keepers of the life-tides.” I think that’s silly. I can just see my wife Gloria trying to 
keep a life-tide when she doesn’t even know where she put her car keys.15 
 
Did you read these as (good or bad) jokes? Of course. But given the right context, they 
could have been received as seriously as the lecture on speeding you hear from the cop 
who stopped you. Stewie Griffin in Family Guy might ask, “How do you expect me to 
fathom ‘To cheat or not to cheat?’ when I haven’t yet solved ‘To kiss or not to kiss’?” 
Depending on how he says it and to whom, it can be a funny exaggeration or a solemn 
lament. I cannot imagine most Woody Allen personae saying it with a straight face; 
perhaps the “personal” Allen could do it. 
 
Whether a bunch of words are funny or serious depends, as VH recognizes (p. 24), on 
its context. Here are two examples from those I have gathered over the years. “Care has 
been taken not only that the trees should not sweep the stars down, but also that every 
man who admires a fair girl should not be enamoured of her”16 If we read this passage 
in a way unintended by its author, it might sound much like Allen's “Not only is there 
no God, but try getting a plumber on weekends.”17 About existentialism, the Polish 
author Witold Gombrowicz wrote: “It seems impossible to meet the demands of Dasein 
and simultaneously have coffee and croissants for an evening snack. To fear 
nothingness, but to fear the dentist more. To be consciousness, which walks around in 
pants and talks on the telephone. To be responsibility, which runs little shopping 
errands downtown. To bear the weight of significant being, to install the world with 
meaning and then return the change from ten pesos.”18 If I didn’t know from the context 
that this criticism of Jean-Paul Sartre was meant seriously, I could easily have imagined 
that Gombrowicz was adding his own beautiful jokes to the aphorisms at the end of 
Allen’s “My Philosophy.”19 
 
One more example makes the point in reverse. In this passage, VH is discussing a scene 
in Allen’s Manhattan: 
 
Ike says to his seventeen-year-old girlfriend Tracy: “I don’t believe in 
extramarital relationships. I think people should mate for life, like pigeons and 
Catholics.” This remark is witty in a Schopenhauerian way because it brings 
two very different things, pigeons and Catholics, under one general concept, 
monogamous behavior. But it is easy to see that other factors add to its comic 
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effect. By introducing “pigeons” between “people” and “Catholics,” the remark 
surreptitiously diminishes the value of the behavior praised; for one can hardly 
regard animals as models, and to compare pigeons with Catholics is clearly 
disparaging to the latter. [pp. 17-18] 
 
VH the philosopher of humor (as opposed to VH as a devout Catholic or VH as a 
historian of theology) finds this talk of pigeons, humans, and monogamy charmingly 
funny. But VH misses Allen’s philosophical allusion and, as a result, misses an 
opportunity to illustrate his claim that context often divides the funny from the solemn. 
For St. Thomas Aquinas found the analogy between birds (generic) and humans with 
respect to monogamy to be both appropriate and illuminating, not amusing.20 The 
source of the humor, for those who know both their Allen and their Aquinas, is that Ike 
chose the unlikely pigeon, one of the Manhattanite’s deadly enemies, as the exemplar 
of birds. 
 
§8. In the episode “Empire” of Law and Order, a conniving upwardly mobile character 
played by Julia Roberts tells a police detective, a married man who has repeatedly and 
emphatically turned down her sexual invitations, that in a hundred years she, he, his 
wife, their children, their friends, and countless others, will be nothing but scattered 
dust and absolutely no one will care who slept with whom (yes, she said “whom”).21 
She assumed the worst, the most dismal atheistic scenario, and concluded from this that 
we may as well violate, if not jettison altogether, the rigorous promises and duties of 
matrimony and, like some mammals (not pigeons), rut in any hedonistic gutter of our 
own choosing. I just completed an exercise in Critical Reasoning by linguistically 
slanting her view to make it sound contemptible. Otherwise, I nearly laid out the heart 
and soul of Woody Allen’s philosophy. Nothing profound here. 
 
Mickey, the Woody persona in Hannah and Her Sisters (1986), is plagued by a 
question: Why should we care about anything, what difference does it make what we do 
and think, if there is no God, no objective moral structure, no life after this one? 
Cecilia, in Purple Rose of Cairo (1985), poses roughly the same problem: If there’s no 
God, the play (drama) of life would not be meaningful and, to boot, it would have no 
happy ending.22 And Ben the Rabbi declares in Crimes and Misdemeanors (1989) that 
if there weren’t a meaningful moral structure and a forgiving higher power, there would 
be no basis on which to live. In these three Allen movies, a similar and important 
question is raised. It is answered in only one of the films, with a Jewish version of Julia 
Robert’s philosophy. Mickey eventually says to himself: OK, let’s assume the worst, 
that there is no God and we have only one life. It does not follow that life is not worth 
living. We can still enjoy life while we have it, which is valuable and something to look 
forward to. L’Chaim. 
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I said earlier that VH’s interpretation is not quite right: “Mickey in Hannah and Her 
Sisters is saved from his suicidal intentions, connected with his incapacity to find out 
whether God really exists, by the Marx Brothers’ Duck Soup, which does not solve his 
theological problem but shows that it is not necessary to do so in order to enjoy life” (p. 
79). To my mind, there is a difference between assuming the worst, that there is no 
God, and not being able to solve that philosophical puzzle.23 There’s also a difference 
between its not being necessary to decide whether God exists in order to enjoy life, and 
promoting the enjoyment of life as the only thing we have if there is no God. Ian Jarvie, 
in my view, gets it right: “Allen offers a simple philosophy of life: enjoy it whilst you 
can, remembering that it doesn’t last long.”24 This answer works well enough for 
Mickey in Hannah and Her Sisters, but all it does is give us a lollipop to suck on until 
we realize that it’s a non-answer, or not a general answer to the problem. It is an answer 
that might be arrived at by a satisfied and doing-well-enough Jewish Manhattanite, a 
member of the economically fluid and solid middle-class intelligentsia. To remind or 
proselytize to starving third-world children that they should “enjoy life” is cruel. There 
is nothing in the answer “Assume the Worst. Nevertheless, L’Chaim” that yields an 
objective moral structure demanding that the haves alleviate the suffering of the have 
nots. 
 
A variation on this answer (which I mentioned in §3) comes from Annie Hall, spoken 
by Woody’s Alvy persona. After telling a joke – Two elderly women are at a Catskill 
resort. One says, “The food at this place is really terrible.” The other one replies, “I 
know; and such small portions” – Alvy remarks: “that's essentially how I feel about life 
– full of loneliness, and misery, and suffering, and unhappiness, and it's all over much 
too quickly.” This is equivalent to Jarvie’s “enjoy it whilst you can” only if we 
remember Allen’s debt to Freud: As long as you are only full of loneliness, misery, 
suffering, and unhappiness, then you are experiencing the ordinary, par-for-the-course, 
bearable sadness of life. This ordinary sadness in fact constitutes your happiness, that 
you are not experiencing anything worse than loneliness, misery, suffering, and 
unhappiness. This realization must or should make you happy. A life that is solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish, and short is better than a life that is less than short. It is an occasion 
for rejoicing. Again, none of this philosophy protects the homeless in Bucharest and in 
Allen’s own Manhattan. That’s why I like Law and Order. 
 
§9. Those who can’t, teach. Those who can’t teach, teach gym. And those who can’t 
teach gym, teach film studies.25 
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